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Some assets are overused or underprovided - why?
Policy failures
The overuse or underprovision of an environmental asset can sometimes be the
result of policy interventions to correct market failures that in turn have
consequences for another set of problems-leading to a policy failure in the
case of the latter. For example, countries may implement policies-to improve
the competitiveness of certain products, industries, regions, or to support
particular social groups-that have adverse environmental impacts. When the
social costs outweigh the social benefits, this constitutes a policy failure,
requiring offsetting corrections or even elimination of the policy
intervention.
So-called perverse subsidies are an example. Many subsidies are introduced
initially to stimulate the use of a good or service that is
underutilized-fertilizer, electricity, water. But in the absence of sunset
clauses, and with the creation of a constituency
based on perceived acquired rights, these subsidies can persist beyond their
economically useful life and be detrimental environmentally. They can be
economically costly if they sustain processes that would otherwise not be
viable (for example, producing rice in California). They can also be
economically harmful if they reduce the costs of environmental inputs to the
point that eventual degradation of this complementary asset affects
productivity (for instance, power subsidies in India encouraging the
overpumping of ground water-box 2.7) or if in attempting
to benefit one activity, they harm others, so that their net impact is
negative.65
Box 2.7
Perverse subsidies in India
Power subsidies in India have resulted in overpumping of aquifers, reducing the
availability of drinking water, and encouraging water-intensive crops in areas
where water is scarce.
In not distinguishing between peak and nonpeak tariffs, the implicit subsidy
has also increased the incentive to overbuild capacity. (In fact, the World
Bank estimated in 1991 that various measures to reduce peak power usage could
reduce power generation requirements by about 12 percent in 10 years.)
In addition to facilitating the excess drawdown of aquifers, the subsidy is
costly for poor people, who typically lack access to power but suffer the
opportunity costs of having subsidies go to others. Since State Electricity
Boards are not allowed to charge realistic tariffs, their accumulated deficits
are at least partly serviced by deducting their dues from the Central Plan
Assistance to the states. This reduced central assistance, along with the
direct state subsidies to power, means that the poorest do not receive adequate
basic services, such as health care and primary education.
Source: World Bank
(2000e). Adapted from box 5.2.
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Energy subsidies,66
the bulk of which are directed to fossil fuels67
in both industrial and developing countries, entail economic efficiency losses.
But they also have highly deleterious effects on the environment, some
reflected in higher economic costs.68
Subsidies to fossil fuel and nuclear energy in Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries total $71 billion annually.69
Studies that simulate the effects of removing coal and other energy
subsidies-either for individual countries or the world-all find significant
environmental benefits in reducing CO2 emissions. And most studies that look at
the economic effects also find real GDP gains.70
The problem is not limited to industrial countries. While many developing
countries significantly reduced their energy subsidies in the 1990s, they would
still gain considerably by removing the subsidies altogether (table
2.3). Although it is often argued that these subsidies are needed to
help poor people, the poor rarely benefit.

In general, subsidies encourage the use of the supported inputs, processes, or
products-and reduce the incentives to find alternatives that may be more
economically efficient. Fuel subsidies to fossil fuels reduce the incentive to
develop renewable energy sources.71
Although dismantling perverse subsidies may be good for society, some groups
would lose. For example, studies looking at the effects of removing energy
subsidies in industrial countries point to a significant loss of jobs in the
coal sector (although there would be real GDP gains associated with their
removal).72
Social considerations may thus call for incentive-compatible transfers and
compensation (see chapter 7,
box 7.7), as well as other support (vocational training for other jobs) to
enable the transition out of perverse subsidies.
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