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Endnotes
1. Utility or well-being has always been
an inherently unmeasurable concept. Despite the limitations, measures of
self-reported happiness or overall satisfaction with life have sometimes been
used as a proxy.
See Oswald (1997)
2. The importance of social participation to human
well-being is reflected, for instance, in the negative correlation between
people's self-reported happiness and unemployment, controlling for income
(Blanchflower and Oswald 2000). Consistent with the happiness data, suicidal
behavior is also more prevalent among the unemployed (
Oswald, 1997). The importance of the environment is reflected, for
example, in the results of a survey of over 35,000 people in the G-20
countries, in which about one in four citizens spontaneously mentions
environmental issues as a major concern facing his or her country. Although the
focus of the environmental concern varies, in part by the country's level of
development (in Asia, for example, people are more concerned about the effect
of pollution on human health, whereas elsewhere people in the G-20 seem equally
concerned about the effect of pollution on human health and the loss of natural
resources), the percentage of people citing water pollution, air pollution, and
loss of natural areas and species was high-ranging from 63 percent (for species
loss) to 71 percent (for water pollution). See: Environics
International. (see International Environmental Monitor Survey Oct-Dec 2001 on
line at
www.environicsinternational.com).
3. Dasgupta (2001a) has shown that along any arbitrary
consumption path, the aggregate present value (discounted integral) of utility
increases during a short interval of time if and only if wealth (estimated at
shadow prices defined along the consumption path) increases during the
interval, at constant shadow prices. See also Hamilton (2000)
4. Adjusted net savings are also referred to as genuine
savings in the literature.
5. Whether social assets should be included in a measure
of net wealth and savings is still an issue of debate. See
note 14.
6. The adjustment for CO2 emissions reflects
the damage to global assets associated with economic activity in a given
country. If we assume certain property rights, in particular that each country
has the right not to be damaged by CO2 emissions from its neighbors,
then the estimate of global damage represents the sum of a) the damage a
country's CO2 emissions does to its own assets over time and b) the
notional damage payments owing to all other countries affected by these
emissions.
7. The effects of improved life expectancy, which have a
direct bearing on human assets, are also not included.
8. After accounting for population growth Dasgupta
(2001b) finds that changes in wealth (adjusted net savings per capita) are
negative in the Indian subcontinent and Africa but positive in China.
9. Some NGOs have begun experimenting with
Internet-based information provision as a way of stimulating debate about
public policy; increasing the transparency of the actions of private
corporations, public agencies, and legislators; and facilitating feedback from
civil society to elected officials.
10. Assets can be classified in many different ways
depending on the analytic purposes at hand, and the list presented in this
chapter is by no means an exhaustive one. For instance, cultural assets can
also be important in affecting human well-being. It may also be appropriate,
depending on the nature of the analysis, to draw finer distinctions within the
categories mentioned here-for instance, between physical and financial assets
within human-made assets.
11. The waste from other species is usually more easily
biodegradable in natural processes.
12. Trust is usually accumulated through repeated
interactions.
13. Interpersonal networks can be thought of as assets,
but networks that fail to give rise to mutual beliefs that sustain good
outcomes are not socially productive.
14. Although there is still a great deal of debate
concerning social capital (centering on what constitutes social capital,
whether the word capital should be used in this context at all, and on
how to analyze and measure the effects of social capital), there is a growing
body of evidence that shared values, informal ties, and interpersonal networks
can have an important impact on outcomes-notwithstanding some of the
difficulties in measuring social capital. See Grootaert and van Bastelaer
(2001) for different definitions of what constitutes social capital; Solow
(2000) and Bowles and Gintis (1999) for examples of objections to the use of
the term "capital"; and
Stone (2001) on measurement problems in empirical work. In the social
capital literature, institutions and organizations are included under the
concept of structural social capital, while another set of elements
(trust, shared values, norms) are included as cognitive social capital. This
Report reserves the term social capital for interpersonal networks and
the trust and shared values they generate, but excludes norms, which function
as informal rules. Instead, as in the institutional economics literature, we
separate the term "institutions" from social capital and use institutions
for the mechanisms or rules of the game (both formal and informal) that
determine how individuals and groups interact, coordinate, and allocate
resources. (Although as chapter 3 shows, social capital narrowly defined
as cognitive social capital and institutions broadly defined to include
embedded organizations share critical asset-like characteristics that underpin
a society's ability to put other assets to good use.) This report also includes
embedded organizations as institutions (but not organizations as agencies).
15. Natural assets can also have "intrinsic" values.
Ecosystems preceded the evolution of humans and can function without humans,
but humans cannot survive without ecosystems. However, in that humans are
increasingly acquiring the knowledge and technology to preserve or destroy
ecosystems, the report focuses on instrumental values.
16. In the more narrow economic definition, two inputs
in the production function are gross complements if their cross-price
elasticity of demand (the extent to which the demand for one input rises when
the price of the other input increases) is positive. Where markets do not
exist, the price elasticity of demand cannot be determined, even though
technically the assets are complementary. We use this broader concept
throughout.
17. The examples given in the text are at a micro
level. A more macro-level example is one by
Knack and Keefer (1997), which considers the role of social capital
using measures of trust and civic norms and shows a positive association with
growth.
18. Both social capital and informal and formal
institutions can lower transaction costs and increase efficiency. In
facilitating innovation, they can also increase productivity growth. Hence good
social capital and institutions are crucial to economic growth.
19.
Krishna and Uphoff (1999)
20.
Reid and Salmen (2000)
21. Galor and Zeira (1993).
22.
Uzzi (1997)
23. Yli-Renko (1999).
24. See
Suvanto (2000) for a discussion of how social capital enhances
innovation and accelerates product development in firms.
25. Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone (1998).
26. A measure that captures both the shortening of life
and the amount of time lived in varying degrees of dysfunction because of
illness is the disability adjusted life year (DALY). Estimates (Murray
and Lopez 1996) suggest that environmental "bads" account for a
significant proportion-ranging from 10-20 percent of total DALYs-of the total
burden of disease across developing country regions.
27. Clark (1898).
28. Even in the most advanced industrial countries,
however, physical assets account for only a small proportion of total assets;
human, social, and environmental assets account for the bulk.
29.
World Bank (2000f).
30.
World Bank (2000f).
31.
World Bank (2000f).
32. Meaning that there is evidence of embodied
technical progress.
33. In addition to collecting water, watersheds perform
two other big roles: cleaning water and stabilizing its flow. Stabilization is
valuable because rainfall is generally very uneven. The watershed automatically
compensates for the mismatch between the supply of rainfall and the flow
downstream because the soil in the watershed is absorbent and releases water
gradually. Trees play a central role in this system by holding the soil in
place (important for water stabilization and cleansing, because the soil acts
as a filter), and by interacting with the fungi and micro-organisms in the soil
to break down pollutants and purify water. While there may be substitutes for
the cleansing function of watersheds, there are few substitutes for their flow
control function, even in industrial communities (Heal 2000).
34. In 1993 more than 600,000 metric tons of shrimp
were harvested from 960,000 hectares of ponds worldwide. About 80 percent of
the total production came from Asia, and the rest from Latin America. The
availability of shrimp larvae-as commercial hatcheries were established through
the Asia Pacific region during the 1970s and 1980s-the marketing of formulated
feeds, and active support of the government, set the stage for the industry's
takeoff in the 1980s
(Primavera 1994) .
35. Farming systems fall into four broad
categories-traditional, extensive, semi-intensive, and intensive-characterized
by increased stocking rates and requiring corresponding feed and water
management inputs.
36.
Primavera (1994) .
37. Note that the economic losses associated with the
mangrove destruction that often accompanies shrimp farming is not considered
here.
38. When the industry is highly developed,
specialization includes producers of farm equipment, algal feeds, formulated
feeds, spanners, and services. Hence, it can involve many jobs and large
amounts of capital equipment. For example, the Ecuadorian shrimp industry in
1990 had a total capitalization of $1.66 million and employed around 100,000
people. Similarly, in Thailand around 114,000 people were employed in 19,000
shrimp farms in 1991, and in India shrimp processing plans employed some
500,000 people
(Primavera 1994) .
39. See
Dasgupta (2000) .
40. Because ecosystems are integrated systems,
parceling an ecosystem into different parts that are then privatized can create
problems since each individual owner may allocate his land to a different use
without regard to the needs of the ecosystem as a whole, resulting in a loss of
biodiversity and ultimately the resilience of the ecosystem itself.
41. See
Dorsey (1998) .
42. Reduction in the ozone layer results in an increase
in the ultraviolet radiation reaching the earth's surface. Exposure to more
solar ultraviolet radiation can lead to a very large increase in skin cancer
rates and deaths.
43. The exercise does not look at the effects of
environmental assets. Physical capital is proxied by investment as a share of
GDP. Social assets are measured by the lack of racial and nationality tensions.
Political terrorism is measured using International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
indexes. The distribution of human capital is proxied by average years of
schooling. The distribution of education, measured by the Gini coefficient, is
taken from Thomas, Wang, and Fan (2001). Why does the distribution of education
matter? In countries with a very skewed distribution of education, education
may not match the level of dispersion of ability. If the dispersion of
education is lower than the dispersion of ability in society, then widening the
dispersion of education can increase per capita income.
44. The minimum threshold level of the (principal
component) of the
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) index of racial and nationality
tensions and political terrorism was -0.23.
45. This focus on assets is not to detract from the
importance of total factor productivity (TFP) growth in sustaining growth. In
cross-country regressions much of the differences in growth performance across
countries are accounted for by differences in TFP growth. It should be noted,
however, that some of the observed differences could actually reflect
mismeasurement and omitted variables rather than true differences in TFP
growth, and part of TFP growth itself could ultimately be due to asset
accumulation. Indeed a main vehicle for TFP growth is new technology introduced
through imported capital and new intermediate goods (embodied technical
progress). It should also be noted that, in looking at the determinants of
growth over time within a country (rather than at differences in growth
performances across countries), asset accumulation is found to account for the
bulk of GDP growth.
46. For example,
Collier (1999) finds that during civil wars GDP per capita declines at
2 percent a year owing partly to a direct reduction in production and partly to
a gradual loss of capital stock through destruction, dissaving, and the
portfolio substitution of capital abroad.
47. Once such low levels of social assets are reached,
there can be a downward spiral in which violence promotes the emergence of
perverse social assets-those based on crime and violence, which benefit a few
members of the group but harm the community at large (Moser
and McIlwaine 2001 ).
48. As mentioned earlier (see note 2),
surveys indicate that people value the environment. Research also shows that
people's health is positively affected by exposure to, and interaction with,
the natural world. For instance, in an article in the American Journal of Health
Promotion, Dr. Frumkin (2001) examined a series of studies looking at
human health and animals, plants, landscapes, and wilderness. Within each of
these domains he found a wide body of evidence linking the domain with human
health. For example, one study found that pet owners had significantly lower
blood pressure and cholesterol levels and fewer minor health problems than
people who did not own pets. Honeyman (1990) has found that people who are
shown urban scenes with vegetation recover from stress more quickly than people
who are shown urban scenes without vegetation. In fact, there is a
theory-expanded by Wilson and Kellert (1994)-which asserts that human
evolutionary history has made a human connection with nature a necessity, not a
luxury.
49. The poor can be affected by adverse environmental
outcomes in three broad ways: natural resource degradation can affect their
livelihoods; environmental degradation can affect their health; and ecological
fragility and the likelihood of disasters can affect the poor more than others
because of their greater vulnerability (effects of climate change on poor
nations). See Department
for International Development and others (2002). See also
Cavendish (1999) who documents empirically how environmental resources
make a significant contribution to average rural incomes in Zimbabwe.
50. The agricultural sector in Madagascar suffered from
discriminatory policies in the past (with negative rates of protection for
rice, for example, of up to 43 percent, and with only irrigated wheat and sugar
enjoying protection). While the reforms of the mid-1990s (devaluation of the
exchange rate, reduction in import barriers, liberalization of markets,
privatization of most state enterprises) contributed to a more balanced
incentive structure, productivity continues to be hampered by a lack of
fertilizer, inadequate road infrastructure, and segregated markets (Paternostro,
Razafindravonona, and Stifel 2001 ). See also box 8.3.
51.
Cole, Rayner, and Bates (1997).
52.
Easterly (1999).
53. See Borghesi (1999) and Shalizi and Kraus
(2001).
54. See Dasgupta and others (2002). The theoretical
literature has identified several factors that could give rise to a Kuznets
curve relationship: if structural changes inherent in the development process
lead to cleaner industries (Syrquin 1989); if abatement technologies exhibit
increasing returns to scale (Andreoni and Levinson 1998); if development is
accompanied by demand for a better environment to which policies and
institutions respond (Grossman 1995); and if the stock of environmental assets
declines over time while demand rises.
55. Based on Sebastian, Lvovsky, and de Koning (1999),
Murray and Lopez (1996), Smith (1998), and World Bank estimates, 9 percent of
DALYs in developing countries are accounted for by water supply and sanitation
and urban air pollution. Indoor air pollution accounts for an additional 2
percent of DALYs. While not an externality, indoor air pollution justifies
public funding from a poverty reduction perspective.
56. And the costs of delay in addressing pollution
problems can sometimes be very high. The experience of industrial countries
with pollution remediation to reduce harmful health effects is illustrative.
For the cases of Itai-itai disease (from cadmium poisoning), the Yokkaichi
asthma (from sulfur emissions), and the Minamata disease (mercury poisoning) in
Japan, the costs of cleanup and compensation to victims are estimated at 1.4 to
102 times the costs of prevention. More important, the costs of prevention were
affordable at the time, given Japan's per capita income and fiscal resources.
The problems were lack of knowledge of the consequences of neglect, and
different priorities. Moreover, there can be costs associated with "lock-in":
delays in implementing changes in incentives to address pollution problems can
lead to investments and technological lock-ins that cumulatively increase the
costs of reversing the environment-unfriendly policies later on.
57. For instance, a study on China-notable for its
analysis of both the costs and the benefits of addressing air pollution based
on firm-level data-shows that a "statistical life" can be saved by removing 100
tons of sulfur dioxide annually from Beijing's atmosphere. Estimates of
abatement costs for large plants were $3 a ton, when 10 percent of the
emissions are controlled. So abating 100 tons-at a cost of $300-would save one
life. (The abatement costs for small plants were considerably higher, but large
plants are a much larger source of air pollution in Beijing.) (World Bank
2000d).
58. However, costs of abatement can be
disproportionately greater for small- and medium-size firms. It may still be
the case, however, that policy and regulatory levels are not high enough to
affect economic growth, because industry within individual countries may be
resisting greater regulation for fear of becoming uncompetitive-with the result
that pollution levels are also suboptimal.
59. Dasgupta and others (2002).
60. The U.S. Superfund, for example, shows how high the
costs of cleaning up severely polluted areas after the fact can be: the program
has allocated more than $100 billion. Part of the problem is that the
consequences of the pollution were not known at the time-many of the sites were
polluted long ago.
61. See
Pagiola and Rothenberg (2002) which provides a good compilation of case
studies analyzing different market-based approaches to forest conservation.
62. Heal (2000).
63. Classic examples of fish population collapse where
overfishing may have played a role include the sardine stocks of California and
Japan in the late 1940s and the anchovy stocks of Peru and Chile in 1972. More
recent examples of overfishing include the collapse of the Canadian cod fishery
and several New England groundfish stocks. Groundfish are marine fish that live
and feed on or near the bottom of the ocean. Their now-reduced numbers include
edible species that New Englanders have relied on for generations. The most
important are haddock, cod, and yellowtail flounder (Botsford,
Castilla, and Peterson 1997).
64.
Coase (1960).
65. Myers and Kent (2001).
66. The term energy subsidies can refer to
transfers to consumers through underpricing or transfers to producers through
overpricing.
67. Some 85 percent of total primary energy supply is
from fossil fuels and 7 percent from nuclear energy.
68. Fossil fuels cause many environmental problems
apart from the better-known ones of oil spills and mining tailings. They cause
pollution (sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide particulates, and carbon dioxide).
They harm health and affect production both directly and through acid rain
(which in turn damages forests and water bodies). They are also the largest
contributor to global warming.
69. Myers and Kent (2001).
70.
OECD (2001c).
71. R&D for renewables is also subsidized, but the net
subsidy (in terms of the relative price effect) is biased toward fossil fuels,
and the total budget drain is higher than if fossil fuels were not subsidized
at all.
72. Data Resources Inc. (1997) estimates that there
would be a loss of 104,000 mining jobs in Europe and Japan
(OECD 2001c).
73.
Eskeland and Devarajan (1996).
74. There are two reasons why a small additional amount
of consumption to be made available at some future year could be socially less
valuable than that same additional amount made available today (why the
consumption rate of interest could be positive). One is impatience, and the
possibility of no tomorrow. Another is the expectation that consumption will be
greater in the future than it is today, which means that the benefit from
additional future consumption will be less. Thus the consumption rate of
interest is equal to the pure rate of time preference (reflecting the first
consideration) plus the product of the percentage increase in marginal
well-being consequent on a percentage increase in consumption (called the
elasticity of marginal well-being) and the percentage rate of change of
consumption (reflecting the second consideration) (Dasgupta
(2001a)).
75. Since the consumption rate of interest is made up
of two components (see note 74), there is no reason to believe that rates
should remain constant over time.
76.
Newell and Pizer (2001). Example: Suppose the current consumption rate
of interest is 4 percent, and you know that over the next 100 years the rate
could either rise to 7 percent or fall to 1 percent. And suppose your project
were to yield a benefit of $100 a hundred years from now. The lower rate path
would value the $100 dollars at $20.28 today; the higher at only $0.20 today.
If you recognize the uncertainty in future interest rates, and place equal
weight on these two outcomes, the expected value of $100 in 2102 would be
$10.24. Now suppose we evaluated the expected value one year into the future,
in 2103. Based on the lower rate of 1 percent in 2102, the same $20.28 is worth
$20.08 ($20.28/1.01 = $20.08), and the $0.20 is worth $0.19. Averaging these,
the expected value of $100 delivered in the year 2103 would be $10.13. This is
very close to the value of the lower rate of 1 percent $20.28 multiplied by the
probability of that outcome, 50 percent ($10.14). In this way, the change in
value between periods comes to depend solely on the lower rate. Why?
Intuitively, discounting benefits 100 years hence depends only on the lower
rate because the higher rate discounts future benefits to such an extent that
it adds very little to the expected value. See also Weitzman (1998).
77. As discussed in the following chapter, both
informal and formal mechanisms shape the incentive structure facing individuals
and hence affect environmental outcomes.
78. The broad range of economic instruments includes
taxes and charges, tradable quotas, tradable emission permits, environmental
subsidies, deposit-refund systems, performance bonds, noncompliance fees,
resource pricing, and resource royalties (OECD 1988;
01c).
79.
German Advisory Council on Global Change (2002a).
80. Fossil fuel combustion is the largest source of
human-caused greenhouse gas emissions-so there are both present and future
costs to society.
81. World Bank (2000d), and
http://www.worldbank.org/nipr/.
82.
OECD (2001c).
83. World Bank (2000c).
84.
OECD (1999, 2001c).
85.
Acharya and Dixon, background paper for
WDR 2003.
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