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Chapter 3: Institutions for Sustainable Development --> Picking up signals, balancing interests, and implementing decisions --> Executing decisions
Chapter 3: Institutions for Sustainable Development

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Executing decisions

As an environmental agency executes decisions through taxes, regulations, and enforcement, citizens and firms change their pollution emissions. The agency will monitor these emissions and act on them, either by adjusting its charges for the emissions or by assessing penalties for noncompliance with regulations. Costa Rica's program to pay for environmental services program (see box 8.5) is an example where institutions shift the burden of protection, help to balance interests, and ensure better execution. There are many other examples, often integrated with development projects, such as the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and the Prototype Carbon Fund (chapter 8). Box 3.5 discusses how locally negotiated solutions assisted in the implementation of water pollution reductions in Colombia.

Box 3.5

Local negotiations balance interests and commit parties to clean up Colombia's rivers

In Colombia, as in many countries, most wastewater is released untreated into waterways. With little enforcement, limits on pollution emissions have long been ignored. In 1997, the environment ministry implemented a new water pollution charge system that is cost-effective and enforceable. Facilitated under Colombia's decentralized structure, the system is implemented by regional environmental agencies. It brings together municipal authorities, polluting industries, and affected communities to negotiate local pollution reduction targets and charges. Polluters are charged per unit of effluent, and the parties agree to timetables for increasing the charges if targets are not met.

All the parties have received extensive capacity building from the national ministry, and the system holds together impressively: In the nation's 135 river basins, biochemical oxygen demand is already down by 31.5 percent, and suspended solids by 34.2 percent. Nationally the program has generated $9.7 million in revenues, funding pollution reduction projects and regional environmental agencies.

Lessons include the following:
  • Use national commitment to facilitate locally negotiated solutions. Regulated sectors participate because authorities have signaled their intent to enforce the program. But each region is allowed to set goals and timetables to reflect local conditions and aspirations. Firms can choose emission reductions-and method-in light of per unit charges.
  • Devise innovative approaches to program administration. A well-respected private bank collects the charges and administers the funds in return for a percentage of the revenues, reducing the burden of collection but not of auditing by government agencies.
  • Enhance the community benefits of market-based regulatory tools. Local business leaders were initially skeptical, perceiving the program as a new generalized tax burden. When it was agreed that revenues would fund monitorable benefits, such as local pollution reduction, this appealed to businesses and communities alike, and helped generate commitment to implementation.
Future progress will require greater compliance from recalcitrant sectors, such as municipal water companies, who use various pretexts to avoid paying and investing. If those who do not comply are seen to gain, it could threaten the more general commitment among polluters, a commitment that has proven to be a strength of negotiated approaches.

Sources: World Bank 2000d; Andean Center 2001.

Implementation is an extension of balancing. When the balancing is between suppliers and customers in a marketplace, the balancing and implementation functions may be one and the same (see box 3.1). Balanced decisionmaking in board rooms and national legislatures is not worth much if it is not implemented-or if the steps from policy to implementation are too far apart. In many countries, laws and protection through the courts are of little value because they are implemented by ineffective or corrupt courts-unless one has connections or money. In others, budget deliberations are not worth much because the budget is not followed.

It is not sufficient for society-or a development bank-to make a policy decision. Say society decides that forests should not be converted if the conservation benefits are higher than the conversion benefits. The implementation of this decision can be blunted by developers who press ahead and convert a forest, asserting that the conservation benefits are minor. The developers count on escaping sanctions-even if the losses turn out to be high-if society is known to lack the incentives, opportunity, or commitment to punish or undo wrongdoing.

How then does one ensure that policies are implemented? Good procedures and broad participation can help in the execution of high-level decisions. Procedures requiring ex ante assessments, participation, and public reviews can help. Routine social and environmental impact assessments, enforced with good quality information and public access to them, can expose consequences before development is irreversible. This can make it clear-to the public, to political leaders, to courts, and to civil society-that the proposed developments do not comply with broader social priorities. The information-and the supportive institutions-function as a commitment device.

In Uzbekistan, as part of the Uzbekistan Water Supply, Sanitation, and Health Project, a social assessment process was undertaken during project preparation. The government initially wanted to ensure that drinking water would have no more than one gram of salinity per liter, although international guidelines allowed higher salinity. The lower salinity level would have been costly and there is no known evidence that it would be healthier. So with the help of local social scientists, a taste tolerance survey was carried out. It found that salinity levels of up to two grams per liter were socially acceptable. The findings from the ex ante assessment were accepted by the Uzbek government, and consequent design changes freed up about $15 million dollars. Parts of the savings expanded the project's geographical scope and resulted in additional pilot projects.27

Many countries have a gap between the policy decision to teach children with public funds, and the implementation of that decision-to make sure learning is effective. Studies from Argentina, El Salvador, and Nicaragua show that empowering parents (through participation on school boards, for instance) can improve the delivery of educational services.28


<<--- Previous Section: Balancing alternatives-and interests

--->> Next Section: Feedback - by and for institutions


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