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Executing decisions
As an environmental agency executes decisions through taxes, regulations, and
enforcement, citizens and firms change their pollution emissions. The agency
will monitor these emissions and act on them, either by adjusting its charges
for the emissions or by assessing penalties for noncompliance with regulations.
Costa Rica's program to pay for environmental services program (see
box 8.5) is an example where institutions shift the burden of
protection, help to balance interests, and ensure better execution. There are
many other examples, often integrated with development projects, such as the
Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and the
Prototype Carbon Fund (chapter
8). Box 3.5 discusses how locally negotiated
solutions assisted in the implementation of water pollution reductions in
Colombia.
Box 3.5
Local negotiations balance interests and commit parties to clean up Colombia's
rivers
In Colombia, as in many countries, most wastewater is released untreated into
waterways. With little enforcement, limits on pollution emissions have long
been ignored. In 1997, the environment ministry implemented a new water
pollution charge system that is cost-effective and enforceable. Facilitated
under Colombia's decentralized structure, the system is implemented by regional
environmental agencies. It brings together municipal authorities, polluting
industries, and affected communities to negotiate local pollution reduction
targets and charges. Polluters are charged per unit of effluent, and the
parties agree to timetables for increasing the charges if targets are not met.
All the parties have received extensive capacity building from the national
ministry, and the system holds together impressively: In the nation's 135 river
basins, biochemical oxygen demand is already down by 31.5 percent, and
suspended solids by 34.2 percent. Nationally the program has generated $9.7
million in revenues, funding pollution reduction projects and regional
environmental agencies.
Lessons include the following:
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Use national commitment to facilitate locally negotiated solutions.
Regulated sectors participate because authorities have signaled their intent to
enforce the program. But each region is allowed to set goals and timetables to
reflect local conditions and aspirations. Firms can choose emission
reductions-and method-in light of per unit charges.
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Devise innovative approaches to program administration.
A well-respected private bank collects the charges and administers the funds in
return for a percentage of the revenues, reducing the burden of collection but
not of auditing by government agencies.
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Enhance the community benefits of market-based regulatory tools. Local
business leaders were initially skeptical, perceiving the program as a new
generalized tax burden. When it was agreed that revenues would fund monitorable
benefits, such as local pollution reduction, this appealed to businesses and
communities alike, and helped generate commitment to implementation.
Future progress will require greater compliance from recalcitrant sectors, such
as municipal water companies, who use various pretexts to avoid paying and
investing. If those who do not comply are seen to gain, it could threaten the
more general commitment among polluters, a commitment that has proven to be a
strength of negotiated approaches.
Sources: World Bank
2000d; Andean
Center 2001.
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Implementation is an extension of balancing. When the balancing is between
suppliers and customers in a marketplace, the balancing and implementation
functions may be one and the same (see
box 3.1). Balanced decisionmaking in board rooms and national
legislatures is not worth much if it is not implemented-or if the steps from
policy to implementation are too far apart. In many countries, laws and
protection through the courts are of little value because they are implemented
by ineffective or corrupt courts-unless one has connections or money. In
others, budget deliberations are not worth much because the budget is not
followed.
It is not sufficient for society-or a development bank-to make a policy
decision. Say society decides that forests should not be converted if the
conservation benefits are higher than the conversion benefits. The
implementation of this decision can be blunted by developers who press ahead
and convert a forest, asserting that the conservation benefits are minor. The
developers count on escaping sanctions-even if the losses turn out to be
high-if society is known to lack the incentives, opportunity, or commitment to
punish or undo wrongdoing.
How then does one ensure that policies are implemented? Good procedures and
broad participation can help in the execution of high-level decisions.
Procedures requiring ex ante assessments, participation, and public reviews can
help. Routine social and environmental impact assessments, enforced with good
quality information and public access to them, can expose consequences before
development is irreversible. This can make it clear-to the public, to political
leaders, to courts, and to civil society-that the proposed developments do not
comply with broader social priorities. The information-and the supportive
institutions-function as a commitment device.
In Uzbekistan, as part of the Uzbekistan Water Supply, Sanitation, and Health
Project, a social assessment process was undertaken during project preparation.
The government initially wanted to ensure that drinking water would have no
more than one gram of salinity per liter, although international guidelines
allowed higher salinity. The lower salinity level would have been costly and
there is no known evidence that it would be healthier. So with the help of
local social scientists, a taste tolerance survey was carried out. It found
that salinity levels of up to two grams per liter were socially acceptable. The
findings from the ex ante assessment were accepted by the Uzbek government, and
consequent design changes freed up about $15 million dollars. Parts of the
savings expanded the project's geographical scope and resulted in additional
pilot projects.27
Many countries have a gap between the policy decision to teach children with
public funds, and the implementation of that decision-to make sure learning is
effective. Studies from Argentina, El Salvador, and Nicaragua show that
empowering parents (through participation on school boards, for instance) can
improve the delivery of educational services.28
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