Endnotes

1. Sen (1999) .

2. WDR 1992 for policies specifically addressing environmental assets.

3. Analysts such as Ronald Coase, Avner Greiff,Douglass North, Mancur Olson, and Robert Fogel have greatly contributed to the development of ideas presented in this chapter, even though they are not directly cited (and bear no responsibility for the content here).

4. Ihrig and Moe (2000) .

5. de Soto (2000) .

6. Besley and Burgess (2001) .

7. Steinberg (2001) .

8. Farrington and Bebbington (1993, p. 106).

9. Farrington and Bebbington (1993, p. 73).

10. Rose-Ackerman (1999) .

11. Steinberg (2001) .

12. Dunlap, Gallup, and Gallup (1993); Dunlap and Mertig (1995); Brechin and Kempton (1994); Kidd and Lee (1997); Steinberg (2001, pp. 27-45).

13. Baland and Platteau (1996) ; Ostrom and Gardner (1993).

14. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón (1999) .

15. Sachs and Warner (1995) .

16. Svensson (1998) .

17. The threat of invasions, in turn, provides an interpretation of why a system of feudal lords or states emerge. See Grossman and Kim (1995); Skaperdas (1992); and Hirshleifer (1996) for an analysis of emerging institutions.

18. This section draws heavily on Hannesson (background paper for WDR 2003) .

19. Botsford, Castilla, and Peterson (1997) .

20. In some instances the stock collapses and is gone for many years. See box 3.4

21. World Bank (2000d) ; Dasgupta, Laplante, and Mamingi (2001); Dasgupta and Wheeler (1997).

22. See Ter-Minassian (1997) ; Eskeland, Litvack, and Rodden (2002); Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000).

23. World Bank (2000d) .

24. Bolt and others (forthcoming). The model uses monitored concentrations of TSP and PM10 (small dust), city and county information to estimate determinants of dust and small dust particles, and then uses this to project pollution levels for a larger number of cities. The results yield good estimates, but are not accurate at the city level.

25. World Bank (2000d) .

26. Holtedahl and Vennemo (Background paper for the WDR 2003); Dasgupta and Wheeler (1997) .

27.World Bank (1998a).

28. King and Özler (1998); Jimenez and Sawada (1999); Eskeland and Filmer (2002) .

29. Ostrom and Gardner (1993); Baland and Platteau (1996).

30. This is one of the reasons regulations focus on installations and procedures, not only on results.

31. Conroy (2001).

32. Alston, Libecap, and Schneider (1996); Anderson and Hill (1990).

33. The logic in this section is inspired by the works of Grossman and Kim (1995) ; Skaperdas (1992); Sugden (1986); Posner (1981); who all deserve credit.

34. Events of hyperinflation and arrests in savings are of course spectacularly brutal-but poor people and the middle class often are hurt through their savings under inflation and fiscal repression (Easterly and Fischer 2001). Formal institutions often fail to protect and support the savings of the poor. Rutherford (2000) documents how the poor pay dearly to find adequate outlets for their savings. de Soto (2000) documents how the poor are harmed when formal institutions fail to welcome and support their assets and activities.

35. See Moser and Grant (2000); Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza and Fruhling (forthcoming); Tulchin, and Golding (forthcoming).

36. Aghion, Caroli, and Garcia-Peñalosa (1999) review models of the microlevel links; Rodrik (1996) and Nelson and Morrisey (1998) emphasize the links through political support, and negotiating change.

37. See de Janvry and others (2001) for a review.

38. Deininger and Squire (1998) .

39. Easterly (2002) .

40. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) .

41. Banerjee and Iyer (2002) .

42. Banerjee, Gertler, and Ghatak (2001) .

43. Findlay and Lundahl (1994).

44. Hoff and Sen (2001).

45. "Our perspective suggests that, as in Bates' (1981) analysis of the political economy of Africa, bad economic policies should be understood as part of a package of often inefficient redistributive tools" (Acemoglu and others 2002). "Institutions that provide dependable property rights, manage conflict, maintain law and order, and align economic incentives with social costs and benefits are the foundation of long term growth ... China, Botswana, Mauritius and Australia-four cases of success in our sample-all owe their performance to the presence (or creation) of institutions that have generated market-oriented incentives, protected property rights ... and enabled social and political stability" (Rodrik 2002); Acemoglu and others (forthcoming).

46. McGuire and Olson (1996) ; Clague and others (1999).

47. Buchanan (2001).

48. Boyce (2002) .

49. Abramson and Inglehart (1995) .

50. World Bank (2000d) .

51. Yes, markets can help in this. Indeed, they are central. But when markets fail, policies are needed to correct those failures. However, policies also fail. So institutions are needed that learn and adapt to support better policies.